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Abstract
We show that court enforcement uncertainty hinders economic development using sharp variation in
judiciaries across Native American reservations in the United States. Congressional legislation passed in 1953
assigned state courts the authority to resolve civil disputes on a subset of reservations, while tribal courts
retained authority on unaffected reservations. Although affected and unaffected reservations had similar
economic conditions when the law passed, reservations under state courts experienced significantly greater
long-run growth. When we examine the distribution of incomes across reservations, the average difference in
development is due to the lower incomes of the most impoverished reservations with tribal courts. We show
that the relative under-development of reservations with tribal courts is driven by reservations with the most
uncertainty in court enforcement.
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What causes economic growth? Despite centuries of inquiry and decades of empirical research,
economists continue to wrestle with this fundamental question. In particular, while it is clear in a
general sense that “institutions” are important for development (e.g., North, 1990), identifying the
specific mechanisms through which institutions encourage growth is a significant challenge (Sala-i-
Martin et al., 2004).
One potentially important institutional determinant of economic performance is the legal sys-
tem, as countries differ sharply in the extent to which the courts enforce contracts, resolve property
disputes, and protect individuals from expropriation by the government. For example, a prominent
literature argues that countries with legal origins in civil (rather than common) law have higher levels
of administrative procedures in their courts – what Djankov et al. (2003) call “legal formalism.” These
countries have “. . . heavier regulation, less secure property rights, more corrupt and less efficient gov-
ernments, and even less political freedom than do the common law countries.” (Glaeser and Shleifer,
2002 pg.1194).
Yet scholars remain skeptical that these studies convincingly show legal institutions or court sys-
tems cause economic growth. The primary criticism is that statistical measures of the quality of legal
institutions simply proxy for other factors – such as culture, political differences, or historical events
– which also have persistent effects on economic development (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002). For ex-
ample, even (La Porta et al., 2008) note that “connect[ing] legal origins to aggregate economic growth
... has proved difficult.”
This paper addresses this criticism by studying how legal institutions affect economic develop-
ment across Native American reservations in the United States. The reservation setting avoids many
of the confounding explanations from the cross-national setting because – in comparison to coun-
tries – reservations are similar geographically, have similar opportunities to trade with the rest of the
United States, and have a similar history, particularly with respect to their relation to the U.S. govern-
ment. In addition, the Native American experience is informative because court systems vary sharply
across reservations, in part due to the (external) actions of the U.S. Congress. One such action – Pub-
lic Law 280 (PL280), passed by Congress in 1953 – transferred jurisdiction over civil and criminal
proceedings on a subset of reservations to state courts (U.S. Congress, 1953).1 On reservations not
affected by PL280, these proceedings are handled by tribal courts. As prior work shows, state court
jurisdiction is associated with significantly higher reservation income.2
We depart from previous work on PL280 by examining heterogeneity in development outcomes
among reservations with tribal courts. We find that many reservations with autonomous tribal courts
are just as well-off as reservations under state court jurisdiction. Yet the income distribution for tribal
1Public Law 280 stipulated that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with tribal courts on affected reservations. On
unaffected reservations, tribal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over civil and criminal proceedings because state courts
have no authority. Thus, the distinctive feature of a non-PL280 reservation is the absence of state courts, not the presence
of tribal courts. In practice, PL280 transferred court activity almost entirely to state courts (see Table 2b). For this reason
and because the exposition is simpler, we will sometimes refer to PL280 reservations as “state court reservations” and
non-PL280 reservations as “tribal court reservations.”
2For example,Brown et al. (2016) find that income per capita is 7-14% greater on reservations with state courts, after
differencing out regional differences in economic development.
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court reservations has a much longer lower tail, which means that these reservations are more likely
to experience extreme poverty. In addition, we show that this lower tail of outcomes can explain the
entire average difference in development outcomes across reservations with state and tribal courts.
Next, we study what contributes to the increased heterogeneity in economic development under
autonomous tribal courts. In particular, we evaluate how uncertainty over legal enforcement influ-
ences the distribution of incomes across reservations. In our tests, we use the tribal court’s civil
caseload to proxy for enforcement uncertainty. This measure is theoretically founded because, when
legal enforcement is well understood (low enforcement uncertainty), disputing parties are more likely
to settle their differences without using the court, resulting in lower caseload.3
Consistent with a mechanism whereby legal enforcement uncertainty hinders economic growth,
we find that reservations with the busiest (most active) tribal courts have significantly lower per capita
income, and that this effect can explain the entire mean income difference between state-court and
tribal-court reservations. In fact, using a Komologorov-Smirnov test, we find no difference between
the entire distribution of tribal court reservations with low enforcement uncertainty and state court
reservations. In this way, our study points to an important mechanism for understanding the legal
foundations of development and for improving tribal courts from within: Reducing enforcement un-
certainty in the courts can facilitate development and may go a long way to alleviating the persistent
underdevelopment of reservations in the United States.
1 Native American Institutions and Development
Native American tribes are nations with limited sovereignty. Their governmental rule is subordinate
to the U.S. federal government, but with few exceptions, not subject to state government decisions.
A set of three Supreme Court decisions between 1823 and 1832 – called the Marshall Trilogy after
Chief Justice John Marshall – established the guiding legal principle that tribes’ relationship to the
federal government “resembles that of a ward to its guardian (Cherokee Nation v. Georgia 1832).”
Under this legal framework, a long history of federal legislative interventions has generated a com-
mon set of experiences among the many Native American tribes. Although the federal government’s
attitude toward tribes varied between assimilation and self-determination during this period, most
federal legislation tended to make reservations more similar, and this is true even for pro-sovereignty
measures. For example, although the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 was a measure to enhance
tribal sovereignty and self determination, the law created a template constitutional form that most
reservations followed.
In contrast to most interventions in reservation policy, one of the most crucial pieces of legislative
intervention on reservations created stark differences in legal jurisdiction across tribes. Passed by
Congress in 1953, Public Law 280 transferred authority to state courts over civil and criminal pro-
3This proxy is a natural outgrowth of the law and economics literature on transaction costs and property rights. In fact,
the notion that cases will be less likely to be brought to the court when enforcement is clear is an old idea that dates back to
at least the original exposition of “The Coase Theorem” in Coase (1960). In our context, enforcement uncertainty is greater
when there are high transaction costs and improperly specified property rights.
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ceedings on most reservations in Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin.
State courts would later have jurisdiction in Florida, Iowa, and Washington, while New York gained
jurisdiction three years prior to PL280. In passing PL280, Congress sought to transfer the burden of
federal court jurisdiction to the states, particularly in regions with greater perceived lawlessness. The
transfer of authority to state courts for criminal jurisdiction was the primary consideration behind the
law, but “[C]ivil jurisdiction was an afterthought in a measure aimed primarily at bringing law and
order to the reservations, added because... it was convenient and cheap (Goldberg-Ambrose, 1997, p.
50).” Table 1 summarizes how PL280 affected the court systems of the largest reservations.
Two aspects of court assignment under PL280 are important for our tests. First, reservations were
not systematically assigned to state courts based on their potential for economic development. Parker
(2012) and Brown et al. (2016) report that PL280 and non-PL280 reservations had similar levels
of credit market activity, human capital, and per capita income around the time PL280 was passed.
Rather, most commentators argue that the objective of PL280 was to ultimately assimilate Native
Americans into the broader culture. Second, a key difference between state and tribal courts is that
state courts appear to provide more predictable (less uncertain) contract enforcement (e.g., Mudd,
1972; Anderson and Parker, 2008). As a consequence, reservations with state courts see significantly
more financial and long-term contracting (e.g., Parker, 2012; Cookson, 2014; Brown et al., 2016).
2 Results
2.1 PL280 and Heterogeneity in Tribal Courts
Although reservations were similar at the time PL280 was passed, there are now stark differences
between reservations subject to PL280 and those that are not (Table 2). Consistent with prior work
on PL280, we verify that incomes are higher under state court jurisdiction by approximately $2000,
both for the mean and median reservation (Anderson and Parker, 2008; Cookson, 2014; Brown et al.,
2016).4 Indeed, a two-sample t-test indicates that this difference is statistically significant at the five
percent level (t = 2.14).5
The difference in average incomes across jurisdictions can be attributed to the substantial het-
erogeneity among non-PL280 reservations, and in particular, the longer lower tail of outcomes.
Table 2a highlights the greater heterogeneity among non-PL280 reservations, which have both a
greater standard deviation in per capita incomes (4523.2 > 3593.0) and a greater interquartile range
(6618 > 4156) than PL280 reservations. Examining the distribution more directly, Figure 1 shows
the greater heterogeneity is due to a longer lower tail in the tribal court income distribution. Although
the income distribution for PL280 reservations first order stochastically dominates the income distri-
4Income data comes from Bureau of Economic Analysis’s Local Area Personal Incomes in 2000. We link this county-
level income data to the location of the reservation headquarters using Tiller’s Guide to Indian Country (Tiller, 1996).
5This association has been documented rigorously in the literature in two complementary ways. First, Anderson and
Parker (2008) evaluate empirically how state jurisdiction under PL280 led to greater decade-by-decade growth in the latter
half of the 20th century. Second, in related work, we net out arbitrary regional differences by using adjacent counties near
the reservation as controls in a spatial difference-in-difference design (Brown et al., 2016).
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bution for non-PL280 reservations, there is little difference between incomes at the 75th percentile or
above.
Turning to differences in court activity, data from the 1985 National American Indian Court
Judges Association (NAICJA, 1985) provides evidence that PL280 had a pronounced effect on caseload
and court personnel across legal jurisdictions (Table 2b). There is remarkably little activity in tribal
courts on PL280 reservations (an average of 1.5 civil cases and zero criminal cases per 10,000 resi-
dents) and almost no judges or court personnel are assigned to these tribal courts. Tribal courts not
assigned to the jurisdiction of PL280 are much busier. On average, they witness over 50 civil cases
and over 200 criminal cases per 10,000 residents. Autonomous tribal courts average over one judge
and four court workers per 10,000 residents.
The difference in tribal court activity under PL280 confirms the intuition of prior work that the
law meaningfully transferred jurisdiction over disputes to state courts (Anderson and Parker, 2008).
6The transfer of jurisdiction from tribal courts to state courts is natural because state courts are better
equipped to handle more complicated disputes, and also offer clearer enforcement of contracts with
appeal to relevant precedent (Parker, 2012).
2.2 Active Tribal Courts and Enforcement Uncertainty
We now use variation in tribal court characteristics to explain the heterogeneity in incomes within the
set of reservations unaffected by PL280. Our results help explain why differences in legal jurisdiction
have had pronounced effects on development of Native American reservations.
We show that the degree of uncertainty over the enforcement of civil disputes explains much of
the variation in incomes across non-PL280 reservations. We investigate this enforcement uncertainty
mechanism using the number of civil cases per capita as a proxy for the amount of enforcement
uncertainty. This measure is motivated by Coasean bargaining, which has been a longstanding feature
of the law and economics literature (Coase, 1960). When the outcome of a potential case is more
certain, it is more likely to be settled out of court, reducing aggregate caseload.
In support of the hypothesis that greater enforcement uncertainty hinders economic development,
Figure 2 indicates a strong negative relationship between the number of civil cases per capita and per
capita income among reservations with autonomous tribal courts. A line of best fit has a slope of
−27.4, which implies an increase of 62.1 cases (approximately one standard deviation) is associated
with a $1700 decrease in per captia income.7 Furthermore, the R-squared in the associated simple
linear regression is 0.141, which indicates that civil caseload alone explains a sizable fraction of the
variation in reservation incomes.
Differences in enforcement uncertainty help us understand why PL280 had polarized effects on
reservation development. Panel (a) of Table 3 separates non-PL280 tribes into active and inactive
tribal courts (above or below the median of civil cases per capita, respectively), and compares these
6Even though tribal courts had an opportunity to hear cases when sharing concurrent jurisdiction with state courts under
PL280, they did not.
7This is calculated using the formula for the log-linear form given in Wooldridge (2003): %∆= exp
{
βˆ
}
−1.
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outcomes to PL280 reservations. After accounting for uncertainty in contract enforcement, there
is no difference in average per capita income between reservations under state-court jurisdiction and
reservations with autonomous tribal courts. Both reservations under state courts and reservations with
inactive tribal courts have average per capita incomes equal to roughly $23,500, and the difference in
their incomes is not statistically different from zero (t =−0.167). In contrast to inactive tribal courts,
reservations with active tribal courts have dramatically lower incomes than reservations subject to
state court jurisdiction (approximately $3000, t = 3.14).8
Graphical evidence strengthens our argument that court enforcement uncertainty explains the di-
vergence in reservation development, not just on average, but across the entire distribution. In Figure
3, we separately plot the distribution of incomes for reservations with state courts, reservations with
inactive tribal courts, and reservations with active tribal courts. Not only are the means and medians
statistically indistinguishable between state courts and inactive tribal courts, but the distributions are
virtually identical. Using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that
incomes from PL280 reservations and incomes from inactive tribal courts are drawn from the same
distribution (p− value = 0.928). In contrast, incomes on reservations with active tribal courts are
less than the other reservation types at all points along the distribution. The downward shift in the
distribution is statistically significant. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the difference in distributions
between active tribal court incomes and PL280 (inactive tribal courts) incomes yields a p-value of
0.030 (0.034).9
Regression analysis supports our interpretation of these findings by showing that they are not due
to scaling, outliers, or population differences. In particular, Table 4 reports the results from OLS re-
gressions of logged per capita income on an indicator for state jurisdiction through PL280, measures
of tribal court activity, and in some specifications, logged population. First, we verify that reser-
vations under PL280 average 7 to 9 percent higher incomes than non-PL280 reservations, and that
the difference in income is not due to population differences (columns 1 and 2). Second, we show
that greater activity in tribal courts is associated with lower levels of development among non-PL280
reservations. A standard deviation increase in tribal court caseload per capita leads to a 5.3 to 7.7
percent decline in per capita income (columns 3 and 4). Consistent with our graphical evidence, the
magnitude of this decline is just as large as the effect of PL280 jurisdiction on incomes, even after
controlling for population differences. Finally, we combine aspects of these tests to compare incomes
across reservations with state courts, inactive tribal courts, and active tribal courts. In specifications
that include indicator variables for state courts and inactive tribal courts, we find significantly higher
incomes (approximately 10 to 15 percent) relative to reservations with active tribal courts. Consis-
tent with our summary statistics and graphical evidence, the difference between state jurisdiction
8Moreover, active tribal courts have more judges and more personnel than inactive courts (Table 3b). This pattern
suggests that the greater enforcement uncertainty does not arise from under-staffing of the court, but enforcement rules and
clear adherence to precedent, which have been mechanisms discussed in connection to the gap in outcomes between PL280
and non-PL280 reservations (Parker, 2012).
9Jointly, the distribution of income for non-PL280 reservations with active tribal courts is statistically different other
reservations (pooling PL280 reservations with inactive tribal courts on non-PL280 reservations) with a Komogorov-
Smirnov test p-value of 0.009.
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and tribal jurisdiction under an inactive tribal court is negligible (columns 5 and 6). Indeed, as we
showed graphically, active tribal courts can explain the entire gap between PL280 and non-PL280
reservations.
3 Discussion
We show that judicial uncertainty is an important constraint on economic development. Our evidence
comes from studying the distribution of long run development outcomes in the wake of congressional
legislation, Public Law 280, which gave states judicial authority on a subset of Native American
reservations. Previous studies have documented higher per capita incomes on reservations subject to
PL280. Our new findings show that the difference in averages across legal jurisdiction is due to a
longer lower tail of economic activity among non-PL280 reservations. The dispersion in outcomes
among non-PL280 reservations is explained by variation in court enforcement uncertainty, providing
novel insight into how legal institutions affect growth.
Our findings point to an important question: What aspects of the real economy are affected by
judicial uncertainty? Although we expect future research will clarify the specific channels, some
have already begun to investigate these mechanisms. Among the most promising angles, uncertain
contract enforcement can discourage sunk cost investment and stymie credit market development
(Cookson, 2014; Brown et al., 2016). Indeed, there is emerging evidence that greater credit provision
arising from better contracting regimes can lead to better economic performance (Ponticelli, 2013).
This conjecture is supported anecdotally, “[Reservations] have a lack of access to capital that has
stunted economic growth.” (Chairman of the Senate Committee on Reservation Unemployment, By-
ron Dorgan (2010)) Further understanding these channels will refine efforts to ignite development on
reservations and beyond.
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Figure 1: The Distribution of Per Capita Income Across Reservations by Jurisdiction Type: State
Courts Versus Tribal Courts
Note: These empirical cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) present the cross-reservation distributions of year 2000 per capita income
by jurisdiction type (state court jurisdiction under PL280, and tribal court only jurisdiction for non-PL280 reservations). The one-sided
Komolgorov-Smirnov p-value equals 0.0617, which indicates that the distribution of income for reservations with autonomous tribal courts
is shifted to the left relative to the distribution of income for reservations subject to state courts under Public Law 280.
Figure 2: Scatter Plot of Per Capita Income and Court Activity
Note: This scatter plot portrays the relationship between per capita income and the amount of civil court activity on the reservation,
restricting attention to only non-PL280 reservations where tribal courts have full authority.
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Figure 3: The Distribution of Per Capita Income Across Reservations by Jurisdiction Type: State
Courts Versus Tribal Courts
Note: These empirical cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) present the cross-reservation distributions of year 2000 per capita income
by jurisdiction type, similar to Figure 1 except that active tribal courts (i.e., those hearing greater than the median of civil cases per capita
in 1985) are split into a separate category from non-active tribal courts. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests indicate that active tribal courts are
shifted to the left relative to state courts (p-value 0.030) as well as inactive tribal courts (p-value 0.034), but that there is no statistical
difference between the income distributions of reservations with state courts in comparison to reservations with inactive tribal courts.
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Table 1: Civil Jurisdiction by State Courts and Tribal Courts
Note: This table presents the nature of the variation in state versus tribal court jurisdiction in our sample, the names of exempted or
retroceded reservations, and detail on the nature of civil jurisdiction over contracts through PL280 or other regulations. Details from this
table were taken from Cookson (2010), which assembled information from an assortment of legal resources (Johnson and Paschal, 1992;
Getches et al., 1998; Jimenez and Song, 1998; Melton and Gardiner, 2006).
State Civil Jurisdiction of Contracts Exemptions or Retrocessions # Reservations (tribal courts, state courts)
Alaska State Courts, mandatory state (0, 0)
Arizona Tribal Courts, except for pollution (9, 0)
California State Courts, mandatory state (0, 7)
Colorado Tribal Courts (2, 0)
Florida State Courts, Optional State (0, 2)
Iowa State Courts, Optional State (0, 1)
Idaho Tribal Courts (3, 0)
Kansas Tribal Courts (2, 0)
Maine Tribal Courts (2, 0)
Michigan Tribal Courts (4, 0)
Minnesota State Courts, mandatory state Red Lake, Boise Forte (2, 5)
Mississsippi Tribal Courts (1, 0)
Montana Tribal Courts, PL280 conflicts with state constitution (7, 0)
North Carolina Tribal Courts (1, 0)
North Dakota Tribal Courts, PL280 conflicts with state constitution (2, 0)
Nebraska State Courts, mandatory state Winnebago, Omaha (1, 1)
New Mexico Tribal Courts (10, 0)
Nevada Tribal Courts (4, 0)
New York State Courts under Public Law 785 in 1950 (0, 4)
Oklahoma Tribal Courts (1, 0)
Oregon Tribal Courts, mandatory state but retroceded for all Warm Springs, Umatilla (2, 0)
Couth Carolina Tribal Courts (1, 0)
South Dakota Tribal Courts, except for highways (8, 0)
Utah Tribal Courts (1, 0)
Washington Tribal Courts Port Madison, Quinault (13, 0)
Wisconsin State Courts, mandatory state Menominee (1, 7)
Wyoming Tribal Courts (1, 0)
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Table 2: Differences Between Public Law 280 Reservations and Other Reservations
Note: This table presents summary statistics on development and court activity by whether the reservation is subject to concurrent juris-
diction by state courts under Public Law 280, or if the reservation has a fully autonomous tribal court. Per capita personal income and
population come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis regional information system tables, while the information on tribal court activity
comes from a 1985 survey of tribal court staffing and activity(NAICJA, 1985).
State Court Jurisdiction Autonomous Tribal Courts
Number of Reservations 27 78
Year 2000 Per Capita Personal Income in Headquarters County
... Mean ($) 23,418.6 21,575.8
... Median ($) 23,165.0 21,794.0
... Standard Deviation ($) 3593.0 4523.2
... Interquartile Range ($) 4156.0 6618.0
Logged Year 2000 Population
... Mean 10.6 11.0
... Median 10.6 10.5
... Standard Deviation 1.4 1.6
... Interquartile Range 2.1 2.1
(a) Income and Demographic Characteristics in 2000
State Court Jurisdiction Autonomous Tribal Courts
... Civil Cases (per 10,000 residents) 1.5 56.8
... Criminal Cases (per 10,000 residents) 0.0 245.0
... Tribal Court Judges (per 10,000 residents) 0.1 1.2
... Tribal Court Personnel (per 10,000 residents) 0.3 4.2
(b) Tribal Court Activity in 1985
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Table 3: Differences Between Public Law 280 Reservations and Reservations with Active and Inactive
Tribal Courts
Note: This table presents summary statistics on development and court activity by whether the reservation is subject to concurrent juris-
diction by state courts under Public Law 280, or if the reservation has a fully autonomous tribal court (separately split out by active tribal
courts and inactive tribal courts; civil cases per capita greater / below the median). Per capita personal income and population come from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis regional information system tables, while the information on tribal court activity comes from a 1985
survey of tribal court staffing and activity(NAICJA, 1985).
State Court Jurisdiction Inactive Tribal Courts Active Tribal Courts
Number of Reservations 27 27 51
Year 2000 Per Capita Personal Income in Headquarters County
... Mean ($) 23,418.6 23,593.6 20,507.6
... Median ($) 23,165.0 22,949.0 20,181.0
... Standard Deviation ($) 3593.0 4087.0 4411.2
... Interquartile Range ($) 4156.0 6067.0 5860.5
Logged Year 2000 Population
... Mean 10.6 11.2 10.4
... Median 10.6 10.8 10.3
... Standard Deviation 1.6 1.2 1.5
... Interquartile Range 2.1 1.7 2.2
(a) Income and Demographic Characteristics in 2000
State Court Jurisdiction Inactive Tribal Courts Active Tribal Courts
... Civil Cases (per 10,000 residents) 1.5 6.6 83.4
... Criminal Cases (per 10,000 residents) 0.0 147.6 296.6
... Tribal Court Judges (per 10,000 residents) 0.1 0.2 1.7
... Tribal Court Personnel (per 10,000 residents) 0.3 1.0 5.9
(b) Tribal Court Activity in 1985
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Table 4: Legal Enforcement and Per Capita Income in Year 2000
Note: This table presents OLS results for the specification
log(income_per_capitai) = β1st juri +β2court_activityi +β3 log(populationi)+ εi
where each observation is a reservation headquarters county, st jur equals one if the reservation is under PL280 state jurisdiction, and zero
otherwise, and court_activityi is a reservation-specific measure of court activity taken from a 1985 survey of tribal courts. The dependent
variable is the log of income_per_capitai, which is per capita income in the county in year 2000. Variables denoted with a (Z) are
standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1 for ease of interpretation. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at
the one, five, and ten percent levels.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
state court indicator 0.093∗∗ 0.073∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.040) (0.046) (0.042)
tribal court indicator (not active) 0.149∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗
(0.046) (0.042)
civil cases per capita (Z) −0.080∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.021)
Sample full full non-PL280 non-PL280 full full
Control for Population x x x
R2 0.039 0.265 0.136 0.352 0.127 0.304
N 105 105 78 78 105 105
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